RUNESVARVERUD
THE NOTIONS OF 'POWER' AND 'RIGHTS' lN CHINESE
POLITICAL DISCOURSE
One
of the questions we may wish to approach in the study of crosscultural
language contacts is the transfer of the terminology and concepts of a
specifie field of knowledge from one linguistic context into another. When
doing so we may make the mistake of imposing the semantics and conceptual
framework of a specifie term in the donor language onto the translation of the
term in the recipient language. One may easily assume that the Chinese are
conceptualizing the Western notion of 'rights', for instance, when they are
using the term quanti
fl;j<1j
in a
contemporary context. ln fact, however, we can only determine whether there may possibly be
parallel semantic fields for the terms 'rights' and quanti in the two languages by looking at the
process of terminological transfer and the context in which the term is used in
the Chinese discourse.
ln the following, 1 shall attempt to show that caution is
strongly advisable when making these assumptions. Finite conclusions regarding
the relationship between a specifie term in the donor and the recipient
languages may be drawn only after the history and linguistic composition of a
term has been thoroughly investigated. The relationship between 'rights' in a
Western political context and the term quanti in Chine se may be more complex than one
may first assume.
1. THE ETYMOLOGY OF 'POWER' AND 'RIGHTS'
A
seminar on Chinese human rights in Oslo triggered my curiosity for the
conceptual difference between 'authority' and 'rights' in Chinese. During a
dialogue on the difference between the Western and the Chinese tradition of
rights, the well-trained Chinese interpreter 'misunderstood' his fellow
countryman when using the term quanti in the debate. It was clearly a response to a question on
'rights' in the Chinese social context but the interpreter apparently heard
the homophone
term quanti fin
for
'authority' or 'power'. The fact that these two homophone words quanti fl;j<1j and quanti fin may be confused by a trained interpreter seemed not to be
a clear-cut case of linguistic
Michael
Lackner, Iwo Amelung and Joachim Kurtz (eds.). New Termsfor New Ideas.
Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China. Leiden et al. 2001, pp.
125-144.
@
Koninklijke Brill. Printed in the Netherlands.
126
RUNE SV
ARVERUD
misunderstanding
but rather a problem of two terms that may not be conceptually very different
in Chinese, and certainly not as mutually incompatible as they are generally
understood in Western languages. The apparent confusion of terms in modern
spoken Chinese di sappears of course in writing, as indicated above. The two ti
( ;j<1j and n )
were also distinguishable in ancient Chine se pronunciation, as the former ti
for 'power' was
pronounced tik while
the latter ti for
'profit' was pronounced tih.1 But
the problem still seems to exist even in writing as the short form quan may be used for both notions. My suspicion
about the blurred distinction between the two was confirmed by a short inquiry
on the understanding of quan in
different contexts, especially in the binomial minquan, among a number of Chinese informants.
This important element in the Chinese concept of 'rights' is also pointed out
by Wang Gungwu: "The power and authority it [rights] stands for has to be
grasped; it is the handle or lever which, when used effectively, gives its user
the right to act."2 Wang sees the tradition al Chinese power-structure
based upon the diffusion of power and rights: "... the total dependence on
power for anyone to have rights at all...".3 The following short exposition
is thus an attempt to pry into the early origins of the introduction of the
notion of 'rights' in the Chinese political discourse of the late imperial
period in order to identif Y how the se two concepts that people in the West
regard as fundamentally different came to be articulated in the modern Chinese
language.
Both binomials quanti are found in classical Chinese literature, where the quanti
of 'power' carries
connotations close to its present usage, while the quanti of 'rights' clearly must be interpreted
differently in early texts. The quanti of 'power' consists of the two characters for 'authority'
and 'strength'. Quan for
'authority' is derived from the term for 'a scale' and thus the verbal notion
of 'to weigh', 'to deliberate', meaning to balance different options, the light
and the
1 Edwin G. Pulleyblank. 1991. Lexicon
ofReconstructed Pronunciation in Early Middle Chinese, Late Middle Chinese, and
Early Mandarin. Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, pp. 188-9.
2 Wang Gungwu. 1991. "Power, Rights,
and Duties in Chinese History", in: id. The Chineseness of China.
Selected Essays. Hong
Kong: Oxford University Press, pp. 165-186; 176. See also Marina Svensson.
1996. The Chinese Conception of Human Rights: The Debate on Human Rights in
China, 1898-1949.
Lund: Dept. of East Asian Languages, Lund University, p. 85.
3 Wang 1991,p.178.
THE NOTIONS OF 'POWER' AND 'RIGHTS'
127
heavy
(qingzhong ~:m ), in
a political context. The authority to make these deliberations is connected to
the authority of a ruler, thus quanti denoting the' authority' of the ruler, as in a passage from
the historiographical work Hanshu (Book
of the Han):
¥.5L~*iiti{* ' fin£!.
+J1:t~~ 04
Comparably there is
nothing greater than the [states of] dukes and their
power
(quanti) is ten-fold.
The
notion quanti denoting
the 'authority' of a ruler is ancient and the later general term quanti for general political 'authority' is
directly derived from this. The homophone term quanti for 'rights', however, is quite another
matter. This binomial term may also be found in early literary sources, such as
in the philosophical text Xunzi:
:fËtJ:fiflJ/ffjg{~iQ
, :M~/ffjg~iQ 0 ~T/ffjgi'iiQ 05
Therefore,
power (quan) and
profit (Ii) may
not be distorted. Commoners and ordinary people may not move [freely]. The
empire may not be shaken.
Here,
the binomial is simply a combination of the terms for 'power' and 'profit'. The
binomial quanti denoting
'rights' is clearly a mu ch later development of this combined notion of
'power' and 'profit' , initially indicating 'power and profit' or 'giving
consideration to what is profitable' .
2. THE FIRST TRANSLATION OF 'RIGHTS'
Ernest
Richard Hughes sums up the effects of the Western 'invasion' of China as
follows: "Western poli tic al thought is in sorne ways the most
revolutionary of all the revolutionary influences which the white races have
exercised in China."6 Simple knowledge about the political systems in the
West had been introduced to the Chinese readership through travelogues and
diaries from trips abroad from the middle of the eighteenth century onwards.7
It was, however, not until after the
4
Ban Gu J"JI[j'[J
. 1990
[1964]. Hanshu ¥Jii
(Book of the Han). Beijing: Zhonghua
shuju, p.
2232.
5
Xunzi fj].:y:.
. 1919-1936. Sibu congkan [gj'fI)JRflJ ed. Shanghai: Shangwu yin
shuguan,
1.8.
6
Ernest Richard Hughes. 1968. The Invasion of China by the Western World.
London:
Adam & Charles Black, p. 104.
7
For instance Chen Lunjiong [)jf[{îIû:t[i1J . 1793 [1730]. Haiguo wenjianlu ~~F>fJ5!
~ (A
record of the overseas nations). Yihai zhuchen i:)~J;'K~ ed. n.p.
128
RUNE SV
ARVERUD
Opium
War that Western political writings were introduced for the first time into
China through translation. Lin Zexu ** fjlJ1* (17851850), when taking upon himself the insurmountable task of
curbing the British opium trade in Canton in 1839, saw the importance of
acquiring a better understanding of Western learning and tradition in order to
deal with the foreign barbarians and therefore started compiling and
translating information on the West. A first partial translation of Murray's Cyclopaedia
of Geography was
enlarged by Wei Yuan ft i}]\ (1794-1856),
a close friend and associate of Lin, and published under the title Haiguo
tuzhi m:~iJ;:&;
(Illustrated treatise on the maritime countries) in 1844 in 50 chapters (juan
:g).8 The compilation
was enlarged to 60 chapters in 18479, to 100 chapters in 185210, and finally to
125 chapters in 1895.
Haiguo tuzhi discusses legal systems in an article
from the magazine Chinese Repository (Aomen yuebao i~ r~ ,Fj ¥~) 1839/40.11
The author claims that the
division of Europe into small nation-states is a result of an inadequate legal
tradition in the West. 12 The text does not discuss or go into details of the
actual inadequacies and content of that tradition, and thus it is not very informative
for its Chinese readership with regard to knowledge about the West. These
arguments and the fear of potential national disintegration are, however,
well-known from the Chinese tradition and indicate what miserable scenarios Chinese
intellectuals anticipated in view of Western influence and aggression.
Intellectuals in 1840 did not see any flaws in the Chinese legal tradition that
needed to be supplemented from the West. The reason why the Haiguo tuzhi contains a very short text on Western
law,13 a translation
from Vattel's The Law of Nations 14 entitled Geguo lüti ;@t ~1!f:7U and ascribed to a certain Huadaer if~m (Vattel), is presuma
8
Wei Yuan ftiJjj( (ed.). 1844. Haiguo tuzhi ~~I!i;E; (Illustrated
treatise on the
maritime
countries). 50 juan. Yangzhou: Guweitang.
9
Wei Yuan ftiJjj( (ed.). 1847. Haiguo tuzhi ~~I!i;E; (Illustrated
treatise on the
maritime
countries). 60 juan. Yangzhou: Guweitang.
10
Wei Yuan ftiJjj( (ed.). 1852. Haiguo tuzhi ~~I!i;E; (Illustrated
treatise on the
maritime countries).
100 juan. Yangzhou:
Guweitang.
Il
ln juan 49
in the 1844 edition, injuan 51 in the 1847 edition, and injuan 81 in
the
1852 and later editions.
12
Haiguo tuzhi 1852,
81.1a-2a.
13
Injuan 52
in the 1847 edition and injuan 83 in the 1852 and later editions. This text was
added to the Haiguo tuzhi for the first time in the 1847 edition, and thus
not to be found in the 1844 edition.
14
Emer de Vattel. 1863. The Law of Nations. Philadelphia: T. & J. W. Johnsen.
THE NOTIONS OF 'POWER' AND 'RIGHTS'
129
bly
not that the compiler saw the need to supplement the Chinese legal system. The
introduction of Western ideas on international law was only seen as a tool to
obtain a better understanding of how to de al with international aggression and
trade.
This translation is likely to be the
earliest piece of Western political literature introduced into China.15 A
surprising feature of this relatively short text is that Wei Yuan has, in that
very short chapter on international law, found place for basically the same
text translated twice by two different translators, Peter Parker (1804-1888),
the first medical missionary to China, and Yuan Dehui R1~*1!! , imperial interpreter of Western
languages at the Colonial Office (Lifanyuan JJI[ ¥i ~ ) in Beijing.16 Their very different style of
translation may have urged
Wei to include both these early attempts at interpretations of Western
legallanguage in his book. Chang Hsi-t'ung has shown that both Parker and Yuan
have misunderstood technical features in the way Vattel's book is organized.17
He has also pointed out that while Parker's translation is more "vitiated
by foreign phraseology", Yuan's wording "fails in many places to
reflect the lucid precision of the original", which is not surprising
taking into account the different mothertongues of the two. These features,
however, do not seem to be a suitable characterization of their treatment of
the notion of political and legal 'rights', a term appearing altogether nine
times in the passages translated by Parker and twenty-two times in the
paragraphs translated by Yuan. Parker seems to have been distressed by the lack
of an adequate term for 'rights' in Chinese and has in most cases reformulated
the
respective passage using terms like 'in cases of' (dang ... zhi ti &" . .. ~ 1JU ) and
'wishing to' (yu iO\
), for
instance in the passages"... gives
men a right to employ force...", translated as "men all have a desire
to fight" (ren ren jie yu zhan AA ~iO\Jï!.x ),
or "for the preservation of their rights", translated as "wish
to secure themselves and pro
15 Cf. Chang Hsi-t'ung. 1950. "The Earliest
Phase of the Introduction of Western Political Science into China", Yenching
Journal of Social Studies 5, p. 1417-44; 1429; Cao Nianming l'ï;&:Bjj .1992.
"'Geguo lüli' shi Zhongguo zuizao fanyi de guojifa zhuzuo" «~~ *{7~» 1i!: r:p ~J\jPf'.tJj1i¥I¥J~ ~*âdffF ('The law of
Nations' is the earliest Chinese translation of a work on international law) , Lishi
daguanyuan 3,
p. 51.
16 Cf. Chang 1950, pp. 1427-31. See also
Wang Weijian .:E#.t{~ .1985. "Lin Zexu fanyi xifang guojifa zhuzuo
kaolüe" #~Uf*tJj1i¥j7!.j1J~~*$iff'plJm! (Some remarks on Lin Zexu's
translation of a work on internationallaw), Zhongshan daxue xuebao 1, pp. 58-67.
17 Chang 1950, p. 1429.
130
RUNE SV
ARVERUD
tect
their property" (yu zi bao qi shen zi hu qi di iO\ El {\j?: ~ ~ El ~I ~
j:t/1 ).
Yuan has attempted to apply a specifie term translating the notion of 'rights'
and chosen to use daoti mfJl[
, or the abbreviated form ti fJl[
, strictly throughout his text, altogether in twelve places, except for the
last two paragraphs printed separately at the end of the text. The term daoti
would not have been such
an inappropriate choice, since the term was already known in the sense of
'principle' or 'reason', thus being close to the logical connotations of the
term 'rights'. Certainly, it is too general in semantic scope to be considered
a good representation of the Western notion of political 'rights', but one may
argue that it would potentially have been better th an the present confusion
with 'power'. Parker has, however, certainly not solved the problem by simply
avoiding the term. Two passages which are integrated as parts of the original
English text are printed separately towards the end of Yuan's Chinese text.
Added to the fact that the strict system of translating 'rights' as daoti is broken in these passages, it may be an
indication that these are appended to Yuan's translation from another source or
translator before printing. Regardless of the source for the se two passages,
however, they bear witness of possibly the earliest translation of 'rights' as quan
which is used twice in
one of these sentences:
Thus the sovereign power alone possesses authority to make
war. ... [I]t is from the particular constitution of each state, ... that is
authorized to make war in the name of society at large. The Kings of England,
whose power is in other respects so limited, have the right of making war and
peace. Those of Sweden have lost it.1S
~~m~~~oo~~.om~~~~/f~o~~~~~OO~~~~.o~ ~Jî~~~J1:tfi 019
One
may argue that the use of quan in
these passages could as well be translated back into English by using 'power'
or 'authority', and the translator may have understood the passage in that way
because of the correlation between the sovereign power authorized to make war
and the King of England possessing the right of making war and peace. The
translator's intentions may naturally not be assumed. Still, the graphie
features of these passages printed separately from the rest of the text and the
inconsistency in the way the term 'rights' is being
18 Vattel 1863, p. 292. The ordering of
the Chinese and English text in quotations indicates which text is translated
from which. ln this instance the Haiguo tuzhi passage is a translation
from Vattel, hence the English text preceding the Chinese.
19 Haiguo tuzhi 1852, 83.21b.
THE NOTIONS OF 'POWER' AND 'RIGHTS'
131
translated
may indicate the earliest translation of 'rights' into the Chinese term quan.
3. THE SYSTEMATlC INTRODUCTION OF 'RIGHTS'
It is
generally acknowledged that W. A. P. Martin's (Ding Weiliang T Jm~ , 1827-1910) translation of Wheaton's International
Law, published in 1864
under the title Wanguo gongfa ~~0i! , represents the first systematic attempt to explain Western
political thinking to a Chinese readership.20 It has also been claimed that
Martin was the first to translate the notion of political 'rights' into
Chinese,21 which is clearly not the case as we have seen above. These and later
translations of Western politicalliterature introduced a wide variety of Western
political terms and concepts into the Chinese language; terms that later became
an integral part of the modern political discourse. These texts and
translations also instigated a political debate heavily influenced by Western
political thinking, a debate that has affinity with the ongoing debate on
jurisprudence and rights in contemporary China.
W. A. P. Martin of the American Presbyterian Mission is
attributed with the translation of the Wanguo gongfa into Chinese, in spite of the fact that a
group of Chinese associates assisted him in his work with this text, which was
first published by the Chongshiguan ~Jf ~'ê with imperial support in 1864. The
term 'rights' is consistently translated into quanti, or short quan, throughout Martin's rendering, for
instance where Wheaton discusses the 'absolute international rights of states' (zhuguo
ziran zhi quan ~~~
EI~~fl):
The
rights, which sovereign States enjoy with regard to one another, may be divided
into rights of two sorts: primitive, or absolute rights; conditional, or hypothetical rights.22
~~~~~ffi~'..~='B~~~m.'B.~~~.on
20 See Chang 1950; Federico Masini. 1993. The
Formation of Modern Chine.\'e Lexicon and Its Evolution Toward a National
Language: The Periodfrom 1840 to 1898. Berkeley: Journal of Chinese Linguistics
(Monograph Series, no. 6), p. 47; Lydia H. Liu. 1995. Translingual Practice.
Literature, National Culture, and Translated
Modernity-China,
1900-1937. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, pp. 279-80.
21 Svensson
1996, p. 84.
22 Henry
Wheaton. 1866. Elements of International Law. Boston: Little, Brown,
and
Company, p. 75.
23
W. A. P. Martin et al. (trs.). 1864. Wanguo gongfa ;1!'!;~0$ (International
Law).
Beijing: Chongshiguan, 2.1a.
132
RUNE SV
ARVERUD
The
sources and inspirations for Martin's coinage of terms during his service at
the Tongwenguan are not known. With regard to the new term quanti that he introduces to translate 'rights'
we can only speculate that he may have been influenced by Yuan Dehui's
translation in Haiguo tuzhi. There
are, however, no other indications that he was influenced in any way by the Haiguo
tuzhi translations of
Vattep4 Already at this stage we can perceive the possible confusion between
'power' and 'rights' in Chinese, a diffusion of terms that was upheld for a
long time and which was possibly utilized by Chinese authorities to curb
demands for extended political rights in modern times; no rights (quan) without power (quan)!
The translation of Wheaton's work also
introduced the distinction between absolute and condition al rights, a
philosophical debate whether rights can be understood as inherent in man or
only exist as political options under certain social conditions. The early
translated texts from the Tongwenguan were probably not widely read among
Chinese intellectuals. Only towards the end of the nineteenth century were
these texts reprinted and distributed in large numbers in China. The
dissemination of Western knowledge accelerated faster in Japan.
4. 'RIGHTS' INTRODUCED lN JAPAN
Japanese
students had been sent to the West to study as early as 1862, but the first
introduction of Western international law terms was a Japanese translation of Wanguo
gongfa by
Nishi Amane "ES ml
(1829
1897) published in 1868. Thus the term for 'rights' was
introduced in Japan via China in 1868, and kenri (fl;j<1j ) is still the current
Japanese term for political 'rights'. The translation of Wheaton's text did
not, however, put a premature end to the debate on the nature and meaning of
the Western notions of political and legal 'rights' in Japan. ln his book Conditions in the West (Seiyo
jijo "ESi~JJ'IJ!f),
published in 1870, Fukuzawa
Yukichi Wî~tiJfrJ2f
(1834-1901) debated the many
aspects of the notion of 'rights' in Western languages, discussing both ethical
correctness as well as political 'rights' such as freedom and independence,
inherent in man by birth. However, he does not apply the Japa
24 See Chiu Huangdah. 1967. "The
Development of Chinese International Law Terms and the Problem of Their
Translation into English", Journal of Asian Studies 27,pp.485-501;486-7.
THE NOTIONS OF 'POWER' AND 'RIGHTS'
133
nese
term kenri in this
publication. Similarly, James Hepburn's A Japanese and Engtish Dictionary, published in 1867, does not include the
term kenri for
'rights'. The Japanese words corresponding to the Chinese daoti and ti (dori, ri) for 'rights', parallel to Yuan
Dehui's translations in Haiguo tuzhi, are present in all these contexts. The term kenri for 'rights' was included only in the
third edition of Hepburns's dictionary published in 1886.25 The Japanese term kenri
was rendered by two
different Chinese characters for ri, tlj and JJI[, in early Meiji texts. The second alternative
was presumably introduced to cope with the negative connotation given to the
term by the Confucian disapproval of seeking ti tlj 'profit' .26 Finally, however,
Martin's originally Chinese term quanti fltlj or kenri also
became the standard Japanese term for political and legal 'rights'.
When Komuro Nobuo IJ\ 'j[ 113 J;c and other Japanese intellectuals wrote a
petition in 1875 suggesting that Japan should establish a parliament and
introduce elections for its members, they argued that the ordinary people had
'rights' which should be made effective through education and changes in the
political system. ln October
1882, Kata
Hiroyuki'
s 1JD)Jj5L~ (1836-1916) work Jinken shinsetsu A fl*JT~)t ( A
new
interpretation of natural rights) instigated a heated debate on natural rights
in Japan when he turned against his earlier arguments for natural rights and
claimed that man could only acquire rights through struggle. ln this, Kata was influenced by Bluntschli's
statism, whose work had been translated into Chinese two years earlier. The
translations of Western texts in China did not have any major effect on the
political debate in China herself, whereas in Japan the Meiji-reforms after
1868 were clearly influenced by Western legal and political philosophy
initially introduced to Japan via China. It was not untillater that retuming
Japanese students began introducing Western learning directly into Japan.
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, law terms not
previously or only inadequately translated were rendered into Chinese via
Japanese.27 It also seems that the Chinese term for 'rights' was brought back
into the Chinese political debate via discussions in Japan.
25
According to Yanabu Akira tPDX:~. 1996. "The Concept of 'Right"'.
Translated
by Joshua
Fogel (unpublished manuscript), pp. 3-8.
26
Suzuki Shüji Jit*{@')j,: . 1996. "Terminology Surrounding the 'Tripartite
Sepa
ration of
Powers"'. Translated by Joshua Fogel (unpublished manuscript), pp. 47-9.
27
See Chiu 1967, pp. 489-90; Svensson 1996, pp. 96-104.
134
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ARVERUD
5. AMBIGUOUS 'RIGHTS' lN CHINA
It
seems that our Western distress regarding the blurred distinction of quan as 'rights' or 'power' was not that
apparent to late Qing intellectuals, precisely because the term quan retained its early meaning of 'power'
while gaining the meaning of 'rights' from the 1860s onwards. One may suppose
that after the notion of 'rights' had been introduced by Martin in 1864, it
would come into general usage as it did rather soon in Japan. ln fact, however, it took several decades
before the notion of political and legal 'rights' became an integrated part of
the Chinese political discourse, and then only inspired by the ongoing debate
in Japan. Quanti was
only applied to translate the foreign concept of 'rights' in translations of
works on international law in the decades following Martin's translation.
Martin was also responsible for the Chinese translation of Theodore Dwight
Woolsey's (18011889) Introduction to the Study of International Law:
Designed as an Aid in Teaching, and in Historical Studies under the Chinese title Gongfa bianlan
0: i!1~. , published by the Tongwenguan in 1877. ln
the introduction to the
Chine se version, the Chinese translators expressed their distress with the
strangeness of the language being created for the purpose of introducing
international law into China. They are specifically uncomfortable with the
notion of 'rights':
01H~5jU~-f4~U!i!\\~Wffl~*t~
0 tJ:i*Xpgfl-lj~¥~xJifiJ{jji~~
0 IZSI~ ffl*fi111~~!11I~$ 0 J1PPD-fi* 0 iFpg/f~:t~~j'1]JiM~~fi 0 3'f:t~fLAJ'.!I! m!i!\\m~~o~~~-~*~mmA*~~.~~~o~~*~W~~/f
Àêo.~~~~/fmB~ffl~iQon
Public
law is a separate field of study and thus a specific vocabulary should be
devised for this purpose. Therefore, when there are occasional passages in the
original text which are difficult to render comprehensively in Chinese, then
the translation may sometimes seem strained. Take for instance the character quan.ln
this
book it carries not only the meaning of someone being in power but also the
meaning of the share ordinary people ought to obtain ('rights'). Sometimes a
character Ii tU
is added to
this meaning, such as in the passage 'the rights enjoyed by the common people',
etc. Passages and terms like this may seem awkward at first but wh en one has
encountered them several times one cornes to realize that there is no other way
th an to use such an expressIOn.
28 W. A. P. Martin et al. (trs.). 1878. Gongfa
bianlan 0$~'I:
(A practical introduction to public law). Beijing: Tongwenguan,
"Fanli" fL{7~ ,pp. 2b-3a.
THE NOTIONS OF 'POWER' AND 'RIGHTS'
135
The
same explanation is repeated in the introduction to the 1880 Tongwenguan
edition of Johann Kaspar Bluntschli's (1808-1881) Geschichte des allgemeinen
Staatsrechts und der Potitik, translated
into Chinese under the title Gongfa huitong 0-i!fItm .29 It is thus clear that quan is consciously used in both these two
meanings, and that the term quanti is
eventually introduced in the early Chinese vocabulary on internationallaw, at
least by the Tongwenguan translators. When, however, the Jiangnan Arsenal under
the supervision of John Fryer (Fu Lanya 1W JSj!Ji , 1839-1928) published
Chinese editions of William Chambers' Homely Words to Aid the Government
(Zuozhi chuyan 1tr:1"Éî~g
) in 188530 and Robert Phillimore's Commentaries upon International Law
(Geguo jiaoshe gongfalun ;@t ~ 51: 1& 0- i! i'iîÎH) in 189431,
quan and quanti were not applied in the meaning of
'rights' . On the contrary, the Jiangnan Arsenal translators used the inverse binomialtiquan
;j'HI for 'rights'. ln
most cases, however,
they reformulated the terms 'rights' (jensuoyingde 51 pJT JJ!1~ , 'the share one should obtain') and
'duties' (jensuoyingwei 51pJT JJ!A ,
'the share one should
contribute') into explanations rather than translated terms. These explanations
were included in sorne dictionaries as translations of 'rights' and 'duties'
but were later discarded from the standard language, possibly because of their
awkward and impractical format and certainly because of the later influence
from Japan. An example of the use of the se terms in Jiangnan Arsenal
translations is found in a passage from the preface to the Geguo jiaoshe
gongfalun:
The
necessity of mutual intercourse lies in the nature of States, as it is of
individuals, by God, who willed the State and created the Individu al. The
intercourse of Nations, therefore, gives rise to International Rights and
Duties, and these require an International Law for their regulation and their
enforcement.32
A/ffjg~:fz:Jn'üt ' ~U~Y:1JF~$ 0 AWA~Y:1JF ' ~W~~Y:1JF 0 Y:1JF9=I ~5tpJT!i!\\~ ' W5tpJT!i!\\1~1'1I. , ~~01~J;.J5E~
0 01~?F-
A -~pJTfjg5E ' JJ~pJTffn~~ 0 ~~~J;.J~~ ' J1:t!1P01~iQ 033
29 W. A.
P. Martin et al. (trs.). 1880. Gongfa huitong 0$Wrm! (An interpretation
of public
law). Beijing: Tongwenguan.
30
John Fryer and Ying Zuxi Bi':tJ:JJJb (trs.). 1885. Zuozhi chuyan {t!:mWi"i
(Homely
words to aid the Government). Shanghai: Jiangnan zhizaoju.
31
John Fryer at al. (trs.). 1894. Geguo jiaoshe gongfalun ~~:-y:):iy0$iiffij (A dis
cussion of
public internationallaw). Shanghai: Jiangnan zhizaoju.
32
Robert J. Phillimore. 1879. Commentaries upon International Law. London:
Butterworths,
"Preface", p. xv.
33
John Fryer et al. 1894, "Yuanxu" ffiJ:J¥; (Original preface), p. la.
136
RUNE SV
ARVERUD
Yan
Fu ~1~ (1853-1921) attempted a different
rendering of the notion of 'rights' when he translated the term into zhi ~ , zhi H or minzhi ~ H .34 Yan Fu is known for his innovative renderings of Western
terms in his translations. His desire was to keep the language of Western
learning within the classical Chinese tradition with regard to terminology and
literary style. His translations are explicitly not composed for the common
Chinese readership but rather for the weIl educated intelligentsia of late Qing
times, and are composed in a highly elegant style not overtly faithful to the
original text, in spite of Yan's own ideals of being 'faithful to the text' (xin 1~ ), 'comprehensive' (da ~) and 'eloquent in style' (ya .m). Precisely because of his literary
conservatism in times of great change, with strong influences both from the
West and Japan streaming into China, his translations of terms rarely survived
and were not accepted in the politicallanguage and discourse of his time.35
That was also the fate of his renderings of the notion of 'rights'.
6. THE REINTRODUCTION OF JAPANESE 'RIGHTS' lN CHINA
Following
the Meiji reforms in Japan after 1868, the fight for jürun minken El EI3 ~ fi came to be a central part of
the political demands raised by Japanese inteIlectuals. The notion of minken
(or Chinese minquan ~fl ) is a Japanese innovation, drawing on
the already imported Chinese term for 'rights', ken/quan, in order to create this new notion of
'people's rights'. By the time the notion of 'rights' and the debate on natural
and political rights was introduced into China through translations from
Western texts, the debate in Japan focused on the more political notion of
people's rights, heavily influenced by ideas on civil and democratic rights
from the West.
Guo Songtao ~B ~:iii (1818-1891) was the first
Chinese diplomat to live in Europe for an extensive period of time, serving as
the Chinese ambassador to England from 1876 to 1879 and to France from 1878 to
1879. His Lundun yu Bati riji 11fB~W e::~ B ~a (London and Paris diaries), published in 1879, had a
lasting impact on the political
34 Cf. Svensson 1996, p. 85.
35 Cf. He
Lin ~II!J\\ . 1925. "Yan Fu de
fanyi" )\\j(f31:l¥JmJJ1i¥
(Yan Fu's
translations),
Dongfang
zazhi (The Eastern Miscellany) 22.20 (25 November 1925). Reprinted Taibei 1971,
pp. 75-87; 79.
THE NOTIONS OF 'POWER' AND 'RIGHTS'
137
debate
among Chinese intellectuals. Guo described the democratic systems of government
and the various forms of elections in the West, using the term minzhu ~.:t. 'democracy'36 in opposition to junzhu B .:t. 'autocracy' or 'monarchy'. The term minquan
appears in a passage in
his diary from 1878: minquan chang zhong yujun ~fl1ji;:mJR'B ,37 This passage, however,
is not an early Chinese example for the use of the later notion of 'people's
rights', as suggested by Xiong Yuezhi.38 Rather, minquan is here simply a binomial describing the
power of the people as compared to the power of the emperor and has thus
nothing to do with the Japanese notion of minken/minquan. Once again, one may observe the possible
confusion of terminology created by the ambiguous semantics of quan.
The
notion of minquan became
the key term for the introduction of democratic rights in China under the
rulership of an enlightened emperor, as advocated by Huang Zunxian j'f ~ 1{
(1848-1905), Xue Fucheng iWmî~
(1838-1894) as well as Kang
Youwei ~~~ (18581927), Yan Fu and Liang Qichao ~mUm
(1873-1929), as 1 will
discuss below. ln contrast,
the notion of minzhu was
despised by all these intellectuals. The contempt for minzhu is less probably a misinterpretation of
the Western concept of democracy, as suggested by Xiong.39 Minzhu, or min wei zhu ~~.:t. as it may be interpreted,
contrasts with
junzhu,
or jun wei zhu B~.:t. , and is thus inherently in opposition to
the rulership of an emperor. This was simply no viable political position in
China prior to the 1911 revolution. 1 agree with Liang Qichao in his
interpretation of the two terms in late Qing scholarship:
xEÇfiWEÇj::=~
0 ~wll~#.1:1~ 040
The
connotations of the two terms minquan and minzhu are fundamentally
different.
36 This term was also introduced in Chinese in
Martin's Wanguo gongfa of 1864. Cf. Xiong Yuezhi H~ J=j Z . 1986. Zhongguo
jindai minzhu sixiangshi r:p
~m:1-1:~::tJGI, ;tJ!'1:
(A history of democratic thinking in modern China). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin
chubanshe, p. 10.
37 Guo Songtao !j!~i;~ .1984. Lundun yu Bali
riji {îIû!j&WE:J~
B~c (London
and Paris
diary). Changsha: Yuelu shushe (Zou xiang shijie congshu Jtr'Dt!tWJRii . From
East
to West-Chinese Travellers Before 1911), p. 76.
38 Cf. Xiong 1986, p. 11. 39 Ibid., pp. 13-4.
40
Liang Qichao W:,Ijj(M:) . 1899. "Aiguolun san: lun minquan" ~~iiffij:= : iiffij~ti
(Third
discussion on patriotism: a discussion of 'minquan'), Qingyibao (The China
Discussion) 22,
p. 3a. Reprinted in Zhongguo jindai qikan huikan r:p~m:1-1:WJflJl1i.flJ (Earl y modern Chinese
journal series). 1991. Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju.
138
RUNE SV
ARVERUD
Minzhu,
as 'rulership of the
people' , was not a political issue among Chinese intellectuals in the late
nineteenth century and was thus only used to de scribe the democratic, or
rather republican, systems of Western nations.
Huang Zunxian, who served as attaché at
the Chinese embassy in Japan from 1877 to 1882, wrote the first comprehensive
Chinese survey on Japan, the Riben guozhi B :2js:~;:&; (Treatise on Japan), published in 1890,
in which he advocated minquan for
China. Xue Fucheng, who wrote the preface to Huang's work, also favoured the
introduction of minquan in
China. Minquan was
primarily se en as the rights and power that the common people had to fight to
obtain, and were not interpreted as part of natural human rights. Only later,
at the beginning of the twentieth century, did sorne Chinese interpret minquan
in terms of natural
rights, then influenced by the debate on naturai and political rights in
Japan. Most famous for advocating the concept of minquan in China is of course Sun Yat-sen (Sun
Zhongshan 1* r::p lU, 1866-1925) who
included minquan among
his 'Three Principles of the People' (sanminzhuyi =: ~.:t.~ ).
Initially the term minquan was used in China to indicate political
rights, the right of political participation. However, the term has been used
with different connotations by different authors at different times as a
translation of the Western terms 'civil rights' or even 'democratic rights' and
'democracy'. While the term minquan was employed in its early political sense denoting 'rights',
one may also find instances in which the earlier connotation of 'power' is
strongly present, for exampie, when minquan is opposed to junquan Bfl or less apparently when it is used in
opposition to guoquan ~fl
'national rights'. Liang Qichao's use of minquan in opposition to guoquan in an article from 1899 may carry both
the se connotations:
~~Wo~~~~iQo~~~Wo~~ffl~$iQo~~~Wo~~~~~ iQ 0 i&~fi~~IJ~fi:fz: 0 ~fi~~IJ~fiL 041
What
is a nation? It is formed by the congregation of people. What is the government
of a nation? It is that its people manage their own matters. What is
patriotism? It is that its people take care of themselves. Therefore, when
people's rights/power (minquan) prosper, then national rights/power (guoquan)
are
confirmed. And wh en people's rights/ power (minquan) deteriorate, then
national rights/power (guoquan) disintegrate.
41 Ibid., p. la.
THE NOTIONS OF 'POWER' AND 'RIGHTS'
139
Later
in the same text, however, Liang clearly refers to the Western concept of
political rights when discussing the people's obligation to strive for their
rights:
~~m~~.o~~~WiQo~/f*~~~.o~~~WiQo~~~*
Bo~mA~~.~~o~.~~Wo~~.~~.~~o~~~~o~
~tjj~~!!JtI:~Am-iQ 042
When
the government suppresses the people's rights (minquan), this is a transgression
on the part of the government. When the people do not strive for their rights,
then it is a transgression on the part of the people. Western philosophers say
that to violate the freedom and rights of people is the greatest of ail
transgressions. But for a pers on to discard his freedom and rights is an
equally grave transgression. These are ail cases of eradicating the Ways of
Heaven.
Kang
Youwei, in his exposition of the Datong shu (Book of Great Unit y),
applies minquan juxtaposing
junquan with
clear 'power' connotations:
~.~T~~~*~~~.o~.~~~T~~'~~~~iQo~~~~
~'$~*¥~.m~~~.~:~:fË~..ff'~~*~'~~mili' Iii; B ~ 0 :jç ~~'f1îfi ' ~ ~f1- ~ifE~
: ;fifJ=l.~~fi ' ~1J~qp~~~ 0 ~~
fJ=I.~*flJ~
'~IJ{=A{~*~~~flJ ' ~fjg~'¥A{" : *~t!5£{~' A~~~ ~~*~~To~~.~m'.$~~'~:M~~~m'w~*~~~.
iQo;fi~.''f1î~~B..'~W~~~~:~B'f1î~~~~~..~M ~*~~ 043
The
power of the people (minquan)
from bottom
and up is the forerunner of the principle of Great Unit y (datong). Wh en the power of the people develops, it
cornes from below and moves upwards. That is the naturallaw. Therefore, after
America was established and the French revolution had taken place, every nation
followed this pattern. Thereupon, constitutions were established everywhere,
republics flourished, the theory of the equal distribution of property was
suggested and labour parties became more powerful day by day. If a nation is
ruled by a monarch (junquan), then everybody becomes selfish and the nation is
difficult to unite. But if a
nation is ruled by the people
(minquan), then it is easy to unite. The common people strive
for profit, but when the benevolent man advocates the joy and benefits of Great
Unit y , this naturally reflects the mind of the people. When the main
tendency is set, th en the common people will follow it like water running
downstream. Therefore, the instigation of the power of the people (minquan),
the
establishment of constitutions, the union of the people and the principle
42 ibid.
43 Kang
Youwei }jj.t1'J~ . 1956. Datong shu 7\i"Jii (Book of Great Unit y). Bei
jing: Guji
chubanshe, 2.70.
140
RUNE SV
ARVERUD
of
the equal distribution of property are ail heralds of the Great Unit y . Once a
constitution is established, the monarch will have lost his power (quan), and this nothing else th
an the rulership of the people (minzhu). Sorne day the monarchy will inevitably
crumble and ail will settle in Great Unit y .
When
discussing the notion of minquan, Chinese
scholars have a tendency to emphasize its 'power' aspects by claiming that the
quan in minquan means 'power'; thus minquan is taken to mean 'people's power in
politics' (zhengzhi shang renmin de quanti jf3Uiî 1:. A~ é1 fi n ) and equals the two
terms minquan and
minzhu ~.:t.
combined.44 Moreover, many Chinese dictionaries will
explain minquan in
terms of 'power' fin, while others will again apply the notion of 'rights' fi ;j'Ij . Western scholars, on the other hand, emphasize
the 'rights' aspect of quan
by interpreting junquan,
as opposed to minquan,
as the 'right of the
ruler' .45 ln fact,
the term minquan entails
ideas from Western 'civil rights' or 'democratic rights' discourse but gives
the notion of 'people's rights' specifie Japanese and/or Chinese connotations,
embracing all of these interpretations depending on the context.
7. NATURAL VERSUS POLITICAL RIGHTS
The
distinction between natural and political rights emerged in Japan when Kata
argued against the application and suitability of natural rights within the
Eastern traditions. Liang Qichao, who had been arguing for the value of
absolute rights, was influenced by Kata and his Social-Darwinist ideas when
propagating the rights of the strongest (qiangquan ~$fl ) in an article of 1899. During the
first two decades of the twentieth century the debate on 'rights' flourished
in China. Minquan was
advocated by most Chinese scholars (and criticized by Zhang Zhidong), but the
debate on the value and existence of natural rights and their relationship to
the right of political participation was hotly debated. Liang Qichao declared
the debate to be a controversy between two protagonistic groups: one
advocating the 'rights of equality' and the other advocating the 'rights of the
strongest'. The former was influenced by Rousseau, regarding the state as based
upon a social contract between the ruler and the ruled, while the latter was
44 For instance Xiong 1986, pp. 11-3. 45 Svensson 1996, p.
87.
THE NOTIONS OF 'POWER' AND 'RIGHTS'
141
under
strong Social-Darwinist influence and Yan Fu's translations of Herbert Spencer.
Liang himself supported the views held by the latter group. Extensive
quantities of Western philosophy were translated, mostly via Japanese, and led
to a debate on rights that was gradually more and more strongly influenced by
the European debate on natural and political rights. Both the "French
Declaration on the Rights of Man" and the "American Declaration of
Independence" were translated into Chinese soon after the turn of the
century. During the first decade of the twentieth century, William Edward
Hall's International Law (Gongfaxinbian 0i!*JTt~ ,1903)46, Montesquieu's De l'esprit
des lois (Wanfa jingti ~i!TI!fJ'JI[
, 1905)47 , the American and the Japanese constitutions (Meiguo xianfa ~~I{i! , 190248, and Riben xianfa
yijie B ::<ts:l{i!~m
, 190549), and many more Western and Japanese works were translated into
Chinese. Three works by the German professor of law and legal positivist Georg
Jellinek entitled Geguo xianfa yuanquan sanzhong hebian ;@t~l{i!i}]\* =:f*ftt~, translated
via Japanese and published in Shanghai in 190850, introduced his negative
views on naturallaw and his emphasis on the law. Through the translation of
Jellinek's work Das Recht der Minorittiten, the notion of 'minority rights', shaoshuzhe
zhi quanti Y
lJl ~ ~ fl;j'Ij , was introduced
to the Chinese readership.
The integration of terms on 'rights' into
Chinese political discourse was a graduai process. When a version of the
Japanese constitution annotated by Ito Hakubun 1j1" )Jjtf X was translated
into Chinese with explanations of central terms in 1905, 'rights' seemed to
have become an integral part of the J apanese political vocabulary, whereas in
China quanti still
had to be explained in terms of its etymology. Duties were se en as a necessary
complement to rights in China by the turn of the century, as duties without
rights make man a slave:
46
W. A. P.
Martin et al. (trs.). 1903. Gongfaxinbian 0$~M,ffii (A new compen
dium on
internationallaw). Shanghai: Guangxuehui.
47
Zhang Xiangwen iJHllz
et al. (trs.). 1905. Wanfa jingli ;1!'!;$:fi'tJW (Essential
principles
of law). Shanghai: Wenming shuju.
48
Wu Chengzhang ,~t'!1:&! et al. (trs.). 1902. Meiguo
xianfa ~~I($
(The Amer
ican
constitution). Shanghai: Wenming shuju.
49!tÔ
Hakubun WJffimx . 1905. Riben xianfa yijie B *I($~m (An exposition
of the
Japanese constitution). Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan.
50
Lin Wanli #;1!'!;l.J:!.
et al.
(trs.). 1908. Geguo xianfa yuanquan sanzhong hebian ~~:W$iJjj(~::::fli3"f,ffii
(A collection of three works on the origins of constitutions in different
countries). Shanghai: Zhongguo tushu gongsi.
142
RUNE SV
ARVERUD
AA&fT~J'.IBfi
'AAm\UI~J'.IB~ 0 ~fIUIJiHIJ ' t!zBfiflJ 0 ~~~IJ ~T% ' t!zB~T% 051
The
principle that everybody should follow is called quan (rights/ power), and the principle that
everybody should fulfil is called yi (dutifulness). When one has quan, then one obtains ti (profit), and that is why we speak of quanti
(rights). Wh en one has yi,
then one obtains wu (tasks), and that is why we say yiwu (duties).
One
may also follow the introduction of 'rights' in the general Chinese written
language by probing into dictionaries of the Chinese language from this
period. ln general,
only a few dictionaries published before 1903 include entries on 'rights' /quanti,
while all dictionaries
published after 1908 include the 'rights' lexicon. One exception is the Vocabulary
and Handbook of the Chinese Language, edited
by Justus Doolittle and published in two volumes in 1872-1873. Doolittle had
the translator W. A. P. Martin write a section on political and legal terms in
Chinese, and Martin naturally included his own terminological innovations on
'rights' which were apparently still not current in the Chinese common
language.
The term 'human rights' only came into
frequent use in the West after the Second World War. The term usually
considered as the Chinese translation of human rights, renquan Afl , however, was used in China much
earlier. Many different terms were used in the Chinese language around the turn
of the century to denote what we may simply call natural rights or naturally
endowed rights, in contrast to political or given rights. These were tianfu
zhi quanti 3'ÇM~fl;j'1j
, tianran zhi quanti 3'Ç~~fl;j'1j
, ziran zhi quanti EI~~fl;j'1j
, guyou zhi quanti [lIL)
~ ~ fl;j'Ij
, yuanquan DJI:
fi and other variants, but in addition also
combinations with renquan, such
as tianfu renquan 3'ÇMAfl
. The term renquan must thus be understood in the broad
sense of natural rights rather than as an equivalent of the post-war usage of
the term in the West. We may, however, conclude that the Chinese vocabulary
applied in the translation of the Western philosophie al debate on naturai and
political rights was formed during the first two decades of the twentieth
century and provided Chinese scholars the lexical tools to translate, debate
and create notions of Western political and social theory.
51 !tô Hakubun WJffimx . "Xianfa mingyi" !Oids~
(Constitutional
terms), in: id.
1905, pp. Ib-2a.
THE NOTIONS OF 'POWER' AND 'RIGHTS'
143
CONCLUSION
This
short exposition on the introduction of political 'rights' in Chinese
political discourse has shown that the terms translated from the Western notion
of 'rights' appeared in China shortly after the Opium War. But the Chinese
debate on 'rights' did not immediately follow the introduction of this notion.
The Chinese discourse in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
cannot be said to have conceptualized 'rights' parallel to contemporary
debates in the West. The debate in China was heavily influenced by the Japanese
debate during the Meiji reform movement. Only in late imperial and early
Republican times did the Western debate find a more direct parallel in Chinese
discourse. The terms introduced in the Chinese debate were coined both in China
and Japan and retained strong Chinese/Japanese conceptual connotations. These
connotations, in which the notion of 'rights' is etymologically and politically
closely connected to the notion of 'power' , are still prevalent in the
political and social reality of China.