The 1999 Lord Acton Essay Competition
Law, Liberty, Virtue, and Enterprise
Melvin L.
Schut
What is
the purpose of government? At present, government can be said to entail a
multiplicity of state interference with our lives that is sometimes easily
seen, but in most instances is less immediately clear. Unfortunately, many
people seem to accept such "big government" as it encroaches upon
them. Although in the last twenty years the arguments against state
interference with the economy have gained wider acceptance, the
relationship between economic liberty and individual liberty remains
misunderstood, and the folly of "statecraft as soulcraft"
continues to be widespread.
In this essay I will argue that a principled
vision of government is vital, since ideas on the character and role of
government are crucially linked to competing visions of society, freedom,
and individual well-being.1 For this reason, we should ask,
first, what we mean by government, and, second, why and in what form we
need it. By discussing these problems, I aim to show why government must be strong but
limited–why, in other words, Lord Acton was correct in writing, "There
are many things the government can’t do–many good purposes it must
renounce. It must leave them to the enterprise of others. It cannot feed
the people. It cannot enrich the people. It cannot teach the people. It
cannot convert the people."
What do
we mean by government? The problematic answer is that at various times and
places in history, it has meant many things. The word government is identified first and
foremost the agent that controls the state, giving governing a natural affinity with statesmanship. The classical liberal and the
conservative would associate statesmanship with prudent and virtuous
administration of a limited public good. However, communitarians and socialists
have identified statesmanship with rational direction of both society as a
whole and of the individuals, families, and corporations that are its
building blocks. It is precisely because the concept has no inherent
boundaries that at various times the term government has come to mean unlimited
political interference with the whole or parts of society. For a proper
understanding of government, we should, therefore, take a closer look at
its intellectual history.
One of
the first thinkers to distinguish between, on the one hand, the realm of
politics, government, and the state, and, on the other, that of civil
society and the individual, was Benjamin Constant. He pointed out that in
the view of the Greeks and Romans, all of life was public. As a result, the
Greeks and Romans failed to recognize a private domain in parts of society that lay
outside the state and beyond the reach of politics. It has only been with
the moderns that a boundary has been drawn between the sphere of the state
and the sphere of the individual: "The aim of the ancients was the
sharing of social power among the citizens of the same fatherland: This is
what they called liberty. The aim of the moderns is the enjoyment of
security in private pleasures; and they call liberty the guarantees
accorded by institutions to these pleasures."2 Constant’s analysis was
echoed by Acton:
"The ancients understood the regulation of power better than
the regulation of liberty. They concentrated so many prerogatives in the
State as to leave no footing from which a man could deny its jurisdiction
or assign bounds to its activity. If I may employ an expressive
anachronism, the vice of the classic State was that it was both Church and
State in one. Morality was undistinguished from religion and politics from
morals; and in religion, morality, and politics there was only one
legislator and one authority."3
Yet from
the predominance of a collective concept of freedom and the absence of
modern liberty, it should not be concluded that the ancients did not have a
notion of individual freedom. Instead, it would be correct to say that the
ancient view of individual liberty had a completely different character
from the modern "security in private pleasures." The ancients
viewed individual liberty as the exercise of virtue.4 As such, particularly in the
eyes of the Romans, libertas and discipline were two names for the same
thing. Its dual opposites were deemed to be licentia –a freedom without discipline
that ought to be despised–and servitus–the enslavement by the passions or by
other men that licentia would inevitably produce.5
The
success of this concept of personal liberty depended on social pressure.
Liberty, virtue, and discipline were accompanied by the rewards of honor,
and their absence was punished by shame. Thus, the character of their idea
of individual liberty made it natural for the Greeks and Romans to limit
the private sphere, leading to the merging of notions of individual and
political liberty. 6
Various
forms of the ancient concept of collective liberty–conflating society with
the state and negating a separate private sphere–survived well into
modernity and have continued to influence views of the role of government
into our own time. Paradoxically, they regained influence during and after
the Enlightenment, which gave birth to the modern idea of individual
liberty. Major eighteenth-century thinkers, ranging from Montesquieu and
Rousseau to the American Founding Fathers, were deeply impressed by
Greco-Roman ideas of freedom as collective sovereignty.
Indeed,
during the constitutional debates following the American and French
Revolutions, the question was posed whether the combination of virtue and
ancient liberty that had characterized the classical polis should be recreated. Some,
following Montesquieu, stressed that a free and virtuous republic based on the ancient
model was possible only in small territories populated by a homogenous
people subjected to the same climate.7 Thus, they claimed, it would be
ensured that government would act in the individual interest of all–since,
in these circumstances, each interest was the same.
In
contrast, the American Federalists believed that Montesquieu had not only
raised problems with the ancient models of government but had also offered
the beginning of a solution: He rightly understood how a confederation of
republics could uphold the liberty and virtue of the ancient small
republics, while gaining the strength of size associated with a monarchy.8 To make this successful, the
Constitution would have to compensate for the lack of communal affinity
between the federal government and the governed that resulted from both
distance in space as well as diversity in climate and population. It was
for this reason that the Federalists embraced John Locke’s doctrine of natural
rights, protecting individual liberty against the ambitions of a federal
government that could not be familiar with local circumstances.
In
America, these arguments by the Federalists carried the day, enshrining the
modern idea of liberty in the Constitution. But in France, the failure of
modern liberty was especially assisted by the work of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, who, like Montesquieu, had tried to adapt ancient thinking on
liberty and the state to modern circumstances.
As we
have seen, the Greeks and Romans recognized a collective interest,
understanding political freedom to be the collective exercise of absolute
sovereignty. Consequently, for the ancients, this freedom was to be gained
through direct participation in government. However, Rousseau reinterpreted
ancient ideas on liberty and government by arguing that the collective
interest had to be rational.9 As such, according to Rousseau,
it could be understood by any government–regardless of a country’s
scale–and pursued by the state. With this claim, he completely bypassed the
objections of individual diversity, overestimated the capacity of reason,
and introduced one of the most powerful and damaging ideas ever conceived
by man.
It is
important to remember these origins of the conflation of state and society,
since Rousseau’s "rationalized" collective concept of liberty was
picked up by Hegel and Marx.10 Through them, it has not only
been a major influence on all types of socialism and communism, it has also
given birth to the welfare state and, more recently, to communitarianism.11 All of these are
collectivist doctrines sharing the idea that, to make people free, in one way or another, politics and
government should extend to the whole of society. All are also rationalist
doctrines, sharing in various degrees the belief in government
"blueprints" for society and its members. As such, all are the
enemy of individual freedom, personal responsibility, and, as we will see,
religion.12
To
thoroughly invalidate unlimited government, it suffices to recall the
horrors of Nazi death camps, the desolation produced by communist rule, or
the destruction of social capital in American inner cities as a result of
well-intended welfare programs. These experiments in large-scale government
interference with society were bound to go disastrously wrong, since they
assumed a knowledge of diverse individual ends, means, and opportunities,
that only exists in civil society. Since all knowledge is local knowledge,
direct forms of government are, if at all possible, by definition feasible
only in very small communities. It also means that in larger societies any
notion of "big government" must lead to a neglect of its members’
interests, since it is only through individual liberty and free markets that local
knowledge can be used and individual ends pursued.13
To ensure
the flourishing of freedom and commerce, it is of the essence that power
not be arbitrary and that, therefore, laws be abstract, promulgated in
advance of implementation, and equally applicable to all. As Friedrich
Hayek says,
"The conception of freedom under the law rests on the
contention that when we obey laws, in the sense of general abstract rules
laid down irrespective of their application to us, we are not subject to
another man’s will and are therefore free. It is because
the lawgiver does not know the particular cases to which his rules will
apply, and it is because the judge who applies them has no choice in
drawing the conclusions that follow from the existing body of rules and the
particular facts of the case, that it can be said that laws and not men
rule."14
By
definition, government confined to protecting individual liberty through
the rule of law excludes all forms of rational direction of individuals,
corporations, and other actors in civil society, since such direction would
have to be specific and concrete, thus endangering personal choice.
Ironically,
just as many have conflated civil society and the state, so others have,
either deliberately or unwittingly, separated the free market from civil society. Many opponents
of the free market claim to defend civil society
against the supposedly destructive influences of enterprise. Yet nothing
could be more erroneous, since such views fail to appreciate that the free market and civil society are two sides of
the same coin. Individuals live in society, satisfying their needs through
interaction with others, i.e., predominantly through the market. Therefore,
the individual, society, and the market are interdependent elements of the
extended order–designed by no one, supported by everyone–that makes our
lives possible.15 Critics of the influence of
commerce on civil society would do well to ask themselves whether the
market is not simply responding adequately to a demand–whether, in other
words, the problem is not so much one of commerce corrupting society, but
of society having a problem in the first place.16
Indeed,
the close relationship between the condition of civil society and the performance
of a market economy becomes all too evident when we compare the prosperity
of countries. Francis Fukuyama, in his books Trust and The Great Disruption, has
shown in detail that many societies are unable to support the market
economy because of a weak moral fabric, an undermining of tradition, and a
lack of religion.17 In contrast, at the heart of a
prosperous civil society we find virtue, supported by religion, custom, and
tradition. It is only virtue that teaches the self-control that allows for
freedom, thereby creating the extended order.
Such virtue
was precisely what the ancients meant when they understood individual
liberty as libertas. Yet the Greeks and Romans needed the social pressure of a shame
culture to force the individual to be free. In contrast, by rendering virtue the duty
of each individual toward God, the Judeo-Christian tradition created
amongst the moderns a culture of conscience. Consequently, whereas the
ancient promotion of virtue led to collectivism, amongst the moderns the
church vehemently opposed any role of the state in the private realm. Acton
explains: "When Christ said, ‘Render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s,’ those words gave to the
civil power, under the protection of conscience, a sacredness it had never
enjoyed, and bounds it had never acknowledged; and they were the
repudiation of absolutism and the inauguration of freedom.18" Thus, the Western concept
of individual liberty is closely bound to the Christian moral tradition.
Indeed, the American Founding Fathers understood that the United States could afford its constitutional
guarantee of individual freedom only because it was a Christian nation–an
observation later shared by Alexis de Tocqueville.19
Yet
Rousseau, despite his love of ancient political liberty, accepted neither
the constraints of ancient personal liberty nor those of its Christian
successor. Those following him in rejecting the "fetters" of
traditional morality should ask themselves how they would be able to live
in a society without virtue, or how they would legitimize any artificial
code of morality. To quote Hayek again: "Rousseau led people to forget
that rules of conduct necessarily constrain and that order is their
product; and that these rules, precisely by limiting the range of means
that each individual may use for his purposes, greatly extend the range of
ends each can successfully pursue."20
Thus,
religious and traditional customs, produced by communities, have jointly
led to the social capital that nurtures freedom. This, in turn, has
strengthened the community by allowing for the development of individual
talent, voluntary association, the family, and so on. No other set of
circumstances has ever produced an equal amount of individual fulfillment,
prosperity, and peace.
Acton’s
insight that there are many things the government cannot do boils down to
the recognition that, ultimately, it is only individuals themselves who can
lead their lives. No other agent, and certainly not the government, can
live our lives for us. Indeed, any attempt to let the government interfere with
the ends individuals pursue in civil society–nutrition, prosperity,
knowledge, spirituality–leads to the government taking our lives away,
leaving us not only constrained but, in some instances, literally dead. In
contrast, government in its proper role enforces the rule of law and
contributes to an atmosphere of trust, thus supporting the extended order.
As two famous classical liberals described it, the choice between these
competing visions is one of liberty or serfdom.21
Melvin
L. Schut was
educated in France, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. In 1996 he attended
the Institut d’Etudes de Paris. Two years later he received an M.A. in
history and an LL.B. from the University of Leyden. Having completed an
M.Phil. in Political thought and intellectual history at Cambridge
University in 1999, he is currently researching his D.Phil. on ‘Alexis de
Tocqueville and the problem of liberty in modernity’ at the University of
Oxford. In the future he hopes both to promote and take an active
part in the culture of free
enterprise.
Notes
- I will use the words freedom and liberty synonymously.
- Benjamin Constant, "The Liberty of the
Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns" in Benjamin Constant,
Political Writings
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 317.
- Lord John Acton, "The History of Freedom
in Antiquity," in The History of Freedom and OtherEssays, ed. J. N. Figgis and R.V. Laurence (London:
Macmillan, 1907), 1–29, 16–17. It is illustrative that Cicero, in his De
Republica (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1970) praises the role of the censor, a Roman
magistrate in charge of guarding the state’s—i.e., the people’s—moral
fabric.
- A. A. M. Kinneging, Aristocracy,
Antiquity, and History (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 162–163.
- Ibid., 163.
- Ibid., 155. As a result, the Romans could use
the words servitus and libertas to indicate, respectively, the serfdom and
the liberty of both the civis (the citizen) and the civitas (the community). (Ibid., 190.)
- Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The
Spirit of the Laws
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), in particular, part 3,
231ff.
- Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James
Madison, The Federalist Papers (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), 281, 284.
- Rousseau did so by (in)famously introducing
the concept of the general will (what the people really wanted) as
opposed to the will of all (their mere vote in the assembly). Thus, he
could write in book 2, chap. 3 of The Social Contract: "It follows from what has gone before
that the general will is always right and tends to the public
advantage; but it does not follow that the deliberations of the people
are always correct. Our will is always for our own good, but we do not
always see what that is; the people is never corrupted, but it is
often deceived, and on such occasions only does it seem to will what
is bad." And so on. J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract (London: Dent, 1913), 22–23.
- Rousseau’s influence on Hegel is most clearly
visible in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991).
- For a hostile discussion of Hegel’s influence
on Marx, see K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 1945).
- For the French origins of rationalism and its
influence on continental as opposed to traditional Anglo-American
liberalism, see F. A. Hayek, "Individualism: True and False"
in his Individualism and Economic Order (London: Routledge, 1949), 1–32, and
"Why I Am Not a Conservative," in The Constitution of
Liberty (London: Routledge,
1960), 397–411. On the arrogance of rationalism in the face of
religion, see F. A. Hayek, "Religion and the Guardians of
Tradition," in The Fatal Conceit (London: Routledge, 1988), 135–140.
- Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, 77–91.
- Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 153.
- F. A.
Hayek, "Cosmos and Taxis," Law, Legislation, and Liberty (London:
Routledge, 1973) vol. 1, chap. 2.
- If it is
objected that Say’s Law states that every supply creates its own
demand, and that, therefore, a supply of vice would automatically
corrupt, I respond by pointing to the Christian’s duty to resist such
temptations—all of which originate outside the distributive instrument
of the free market.
Cf. Infra.
- Francis
Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (London:
Penguin, 1996), and The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the
Reconstitution of the Social Order (London: Profile,
1999).
- Acton, 29.
- Alexis de
Tocqueville, Democracy in America (London: David
Campbell Publishers, 1994), vol. 1, chap. 17, "Principal Causes
Which Tend to Maintain the Democratic Republic in the United States,"
288ff. On pages 303–304 Tocqueville writes, "There is no country
in the world where the Christian religion retains a greater influence
over the soul of men than in America; and there can be no greater
proof of its utility and of its conforming to human nature than that
its influence is powerfully felt over the most enlightened and free nation of
the world."
- Hayek, The
Fatal Conceit, 49.
- Alexis de Tocqueville, in Democracy in America, was the first to warn of the serfdom that would result from
big government. Tocqueville’s warning later inspired F. A. Hayek to
write his The Road to Serfdom
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pointing out the dangers
of collectivism.
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